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Abstract
This paper reports the results of an economic experiment which was designed to test the effect of
racial identity on generosity in a non-strategic setting. A sample of undergraduate university
students was recruited to participate in a dictator game, where surnames of individuals were
revealed to convey information about racial identity. Results indicate that compared to a set of
control experiments where participant identity was kept anonymous, revealing racial identity has
a significant and positive impact on the size of the offers made. However, while Black participants
did not vary their offers based on the racial identity of their partners, White participants were more
generous towards White partners than Black partners, exhibiting insider favouritism in their offers.
JEL Classification: C90, C91, D64, J15
Keywords: Altruism, dictator game, racial identity, experimental economics
1. INTRODUCTION
The far-reaching social and institutional changes that have occurred in South Africa since
the demise of apartheid provide a unique backdrop against which to examine the impact of
social context, as revealed through racial identity, on individual willingness to redistribute
resources. While there is a well-established tradition of relying on attitudinal questionnaires
and surveys to elicit social capital measures of inter-racial trust, xenophobia, as well as
attitudes towards redistribution and affirmative action, these methods suffer from the
possibility that individuals may have an incentive to lie or mis-report, particularly when
answering questions that are sensitive, or where political correctness may be demanded.
Moreover, there may be a divergence between the way individuals answer survey questions
and their actual behaviour when confronted with a real-life situation.
In this paper, we rely on an experimental game, namely the dictator game, to provide
a behaviourally grounded measure of generosity (or altruism), and explore whether this
propensity is affected by knowledge of the racial identity of one’s partner. Using surnames
to convey racial identity of participants, we find that while White proposers make
significantly higher offers than Black proposers, they also tend to exhibit an insider bias
in their behaviour, favouring White partners over Black. These results remain robust, even
after we control for potential doubt about the credibility of the experiment in the minds
of participants.
2. MEASURING ALTRUISM USING THE DICTATOR GAME
The dictator game is one of a series of experiments that has been developed to show that
the utility optimising choice for economic agents is not necessarily the money maximising
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choice. In the experimental setting, individuals are asked to make choices that will reveal
their behaviour to the experimenter. Moreover, these choice decisions are made with real
money, which incentivises individuals to reveal their true behaviour. This makes
experiments a good means of distinguishing between what people say they would do, and
what they actually do.
If one characterises redistribution as the voluntary non-reciprocal transfer of resources
from one individual to another, then the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) provides a
good vehicle for examining individual behaviour in this regard. In the dictator game, two
individuals are paired together. The proposer (first mover) is given a fixed endowment and
asked whether they would like to transfer any amount to their partner in a one-way split.
There is no strategic interaction here, and the proposer does not stand to benefit
materially from sacrificing his resources in order to improve the payoff of his partner.
Despite the game theoretic prediction that zero resources should be transferred, there is
substantial evidence of non-self-interested behaviour in these settings, particularly when
initial positions are randomly allocated (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994).1
There is now a well-established body of results from dictator games that suggest that
proposers offer 20% of their allocated endowment on average, with offers ranging from
10 to 25%, and modes at 0 and 50% (Carpenter, 2002).
The compelling evidence of non-selfish behaviour in this game suggests that
individuals may be motivated by factors other than material gain. A myriad of possibilities
suggest themselves here, including the social distance (perceived and actual) between the
two individuals (Akerlof, 1997), attitudes about the deservingness of the recipient (Eckel
and Grossman, 1996), the extent of inequality aversion on the part of the proposer (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999), as well as ethics and moral codes (Frolich et al., 2001). In a double
blind treatment (where players are anonymous and the experimenter cannot track
individual actions), self-interest emerges very strongly as 70% of proposers send nothing
to the recipient Player B. Once the experiment is changed to a single blind treatment and
some information about Player B is revealed, offers rise significantly (Carpenter, 2002).
For example, in a study by Eckel and Grossman (1996), in an anonymous treatment,
proposers sent an average of 10.6% of their allocated money to their anonymous partner.
By way of contrast, in a second treatment, when the proposer was told that they had the
opportunity to give to the Red Cross, offers increased significantly to 31%. Knowing
something about one’s partner in this interaction clearly affected the proposer’s offer.
Evidence that identity or status matters for “social exchange” (Blau, 1964) is not
without precedent. There is a large social psychology literature which confirms that even
arbitrary (or minimal) group affiliations can affect the way that people treat others.
(Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Turner et al., 1979; Tajfel, 1982), and that individuals act to
favor members of their in-group over those whom they perceive to be members of the
out-group, however the “group” is defined (Bowles et al., 2001; Loury, 2001). Even
relatively superficial contexts or frames affects behaviour significantly, as long as the status
of the parties involved in the interaction is publicly revealed (Eckel and Grossman, 1996;
Ball et al., 2001; Hoff and Pandey, 2003).
In the limited information setting of social exchange, that publicly revealed identity
should matter makes sense. Individuals rely on costlessly observable cues such as race and
1 However, the dictator game is extremely sensitive to framing effects. For example, dictator games
produce more self-interested behaviour when framed as a market (Roth, 1995).
267South African Journal of Economics Vol. 76:2 June 2008
© 2008 The Authors.
Journal compilation © 2008 Economic Society of South Africa.
gender to distinguish between individuals, especially in segmented societies where
such characteristics hold some social significance. Moreover, because they are costlessly
observable, these visual cues are likely to be privileged over other categorisations, such as
class or educational background, even when the latter might be more relevant (Chandra,
2003; Cornell and Welch, 1996).
Yet, behavioural economists are only now beginning to focus attention on the ways in
which personal attributes such as race and gender affect outcomes in social exchange, and
the majority of experimental work that has been done has focused almost exclusively on
studying the effect that the personal characteristics of the proposer, gender in particular,
has on the offers made. In the dictator game setting specifically, Eckel and Grossman
(1996; Eckel, 1998) and Selten and Ockenfels (1998) find evidence that women are more
generous than men, while Bolton and Katok (1995) find no significant gender differences
in giving. However, Dufwenberg and Muren (2002) find that when the gender of the
partner in the dictator game is revealed to the proposer, women receive higher offers than
men, particularly from other men. Holm and Engseld (2001) find that if the dictator
knows the gender and income of the recipient, low income women receive considerably
higher donations than high income men.
Interestingly, the evidence concerning the impact of racial identity on offers made in
the dictator game is more mixed. In a series of dictator game experiments run in South
Africa, USA and Russia, Ashraf et al. (2003) do not find significant differences in the
mean offers made by White and non-White proposers, and more specifically, they do not
find significant differences in the mean offers made by White and non-White South
African proposers. Note, however, that in these games, proposers did not know the racial
identity of their partners in the game. Arguably, in a dictator game setting, the racial
identity of the passive recipient may be an important predictor of offers. In a 2001 study,
Fershtman and Gneezy recruited Eastern Jews and Ashkenazi Jews in Israel to participate
in a dictator game, where names of participants were revealed in order to convey
information about ethnic identity. Importantly, proposers in these games knew the
surnames, and hence the ethnic identity, of their partners. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)
did not find any significant differences in the average offers made in a dictator game to
members of these different ethnic groups in Israel. By way of contrast, in a series of
dictator games run with a sample of high school students in the Western Cape, where
photographs were used to reveal the racial identity of partners, Burns (2003) finds that
while Black and Coloured proposers make significantly higher offers to Black recipients
in the game, White proposers make significantly lower offers towards Black partners.
Burns (2003) links these differences in altruistic behaviour towards Black students to
differences in attitudes towards redistribution, affirmative action and perceived relative
well-being.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this study, we follow the Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) design by using surnames of
participants to reveal something about the racial identity of participants. Black African
and White undergraduate students were recruited from the University of Cape Town to
participate in a dictator game. Participants were signed up at various points on the
campus, while others were signed up during lectures. Of all the participants that signed
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up, two hundred and forty2 were selected3 based on whether or not they had surnames
that were clearly identifiable as being typically Black surnames or typically White
surnames (See Appendix 1 for example). The participants were then randomly allocated
to two treatments: an anonymous treatment in which the proposer and recipient knew
nothing about each other and a race treatment in which proposers were told the surnames
of the recipients with whom they were paired. Most participants were aged 18 to 22, and
the gender split was almost equal with slightly more females than males in the sample.
While half were commerce students, the rest were evenly distributed between all the other
faculties.
On the specified day, all participants for a given session met in a classroom. This was
done to ensure that once the game began, the proposers had credible evidence that they
were in fact paired with a real person. The experimental game was clearly explained and
described as a simple decision-making exercise, with care being taken to avoid framing the
game in any particular way. Participants were also informed that they would all receive a
participation fee of R20 to compensate them for their time. Once participants had
completed their consent forms, those players who had been assigned to be the recipient
Player B’s in the game were taken next door to a separate classroom.
Proposers were then each given an additional endowment of R50 to use in the
experiment, and asked if they would like to send any amount to the recipient they had
been paired with. Offers could be made in denominations of one rand. The only
difference between the anonymous treatment and the race treatment was that in the race
treatment, proposers were provided with the surname of the recipient they had been
paired with, while in the anonymous treatment, the proposer had no information about
their partner. The recipients in these games had no information about their partners in
either treatment,4 and thus, the proposers were aware that they could not be identified in
any way, nor be associated with any particular offer made. Once the experiment was
completed, all participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that elicited basic
socio-demographic and attitudinal information.
4. RESULTS
Table 1 presents the mean and median offers made in these games.
Result 1. Proposers make significantly higher offers when they know the racial identity
of their partner than when identity is anonymous.
2 This sample size is comparable to those studies reported in the international literature
(Carpenter, 2002).
3 It is important to note that little attention has been paid in the international literature to
potential selection effects that arise in relation to experimental work. If the characteristics of those
who voluntarily sign up to participate differ significantly from those who decline to participate,
this may introduce bias into the results. However, we follow international best practice here,
by simply recruiting as large a sample as possible, and then randomly selecting from within that
group. This also means that the results reported here may not necessarily be generalisable beyond
this particular sample.
4 Note, however, that the recipients had the same information about the game as the proposers.
In other words, they were informed that the proposers had each been given an additional
endowment of R50 and were being asked to decide whether to transfer any of this amount to
them. Proposers were also aware that the recipients had this information.
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The mean offer in the anonymous treatment was R7.32 (or 15% of the endowment)
out of R50) while the median offer was zero. By way of contrast, mean offers in the race
treatment were significantly higher at R12.60 on average (or 25% of the endowment).
The mean and median offers in the anonymous and race treatments are significantly
different at the 1% level. This is confirmed by an ANOVA test as well as the Kruskal
Wallis and Median test. Thus, simply revealing racial identity (through surnames) is
associated with an increase in offer size of more than 70%. This finding is consistent with
that of Eckel and Grossman (1996) who showed that when proposers knew something
about their partners, this had a significant and positive impact on the size of offers made.
Result 2. White proposers make significantly higher offers than Black proposers, but
exhibit insider favouritism whilst Black proposers do not.
Table 1 also presents the offers made conditional on the race of the proposer, as well as
for the different combinations of the pairs by race groups. There is a significant difference
in the size of offers made by Black proposers relative to White proposers on average,
in both treatments. In the anonymous treatment, White proposers offer 17% of
their endowment compared to 13% for Black proposers, while in the race treatment,
White proposers offer 29% of their endowment on average compared to 19% for Black
proposers. These differences are significant.
This difference in levels may arguably be attributable to socio-economic differences
between Black and White students. Table 2 presents evidence based on the responses to
the survey instrument that suggests that on average, White students in the sample were
better off than Black students. Two-thirds of Black participants reported being on
financial aid at university compared with less than a fifth of White participants. Strikingly,
while almost a third of Black participants classified their families as low-income or poor,
only 1% of White participants did the same. This is consistent with the self-reports on the
employment status of the participants’ parents.
Table 1. Mean and median offers of proposers in dictator game, by treatment
Mean
(rands)
% of
endowment
Median
(rands)
% of
endowment
Number
of pairs (n)
Anonymous treatment
Offers by White proposer 8.21 17 2.50 5 14
Offers by Black proposer 6.42 13 0.00 0 14
Combined offers 7.32 15 0.00 0 28
Race treatment
Offers by White proposer 14.50 29 15.00 30 44
Offers by Black proposer 9.53 19 10.00 20 43
Combined offers 12.60 25 10.00 20 87
White to White 17.00 34 20.00 40 21
White to Black 12.30 25 10.00 20 23
Black to White 9.13 18 10.00 20 20
Black to Black 10.00 20 10.00 20 23
Table 2. Selected socio-economic characteristics of participants
Participant is White (%) Participant is Black (%)
I am on financial aid to be at university. 17.20 66.70
My family is better off than most South African families. 83.00 41.10
Family’s financial situation: rich and upper income (self-reported) 48.00 14.40
Family’s financial situation: lower income and poor (self-reported) 1.00 32.40
My father is employed 98.4 66.9
My mother is employed 74.1 23.2
Notes: These statistics include all participants, namely, proposers and recipients.
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However, in spite of the differences in the magnitude of the offers made by proposers,
it is also apparent that White proposers exhibit an insider bias, making significantly
higher offers to partners with White-sounding surnames, than compared with partners
with Black-sounding surnames. The median offer in a White–White pairing is double the
median offer in a White–Black pairing. This is consistent with the results found by Burns
(2003) cited earlier. By way of contrast, this insider bias appears to be absent in the
behaviour of Black proposers in this sample, with median offers in Black–Black pairings
being identical to that in Black–White pairings, and very small (and insignificant)
differences in mean offers.
These results are confirmed in the Tobit5 regression results presented in Table 3. These
results pertain to the data generated in the race treatment only. Note that in the pooled
sample presented in Column 1, Black proposers make significantly lower offers than
White proposers. Similarly, the results presented in Columns 2 and 3 confirm that White
proposers make significantly lower offers to Black recipients, while Black proposers do not
exhibit any significant bias in their offers.
While socio-economic differences may help explain the difference in magnitude of the
offers made by proposers, it is less apparent why it should be the case that these features
should also result in differences in offers being made conditional on the race of the
recipient. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that if it is in fact socio-economic status as
opposed to racial identity that drives behaviour in this game, one might expect that offers
to Black recipients should be significantly higher than to White recipients in all cases.
5 Given the problem of censoring at zero in this data, Ordinary Least Squares results would
provide biased estimates. Hence standard practice in this literature is to use Tobit regressions
(Carpenter, 2002; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Fershtman et al., 2002).
Table 3. Offer made, controlling for racial identity and doubt
Dependant variable: Amount Sent All Proposer is Black Proposer is White
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -47.36 -76.44 -151.68
(-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.75)
Proposer is Black -4.66**
(-2.26)
Recipient is Black -2.09 2.15 -4.78***
(-1.08) (0.82) (-1.69)
Age of proposer 5.53 9.03 15.04
(0.44) (0.50) (0.78)
Age Squared of proposer -0.13 -0.23 -0.34
(-0.42) (-0.52) (-0.75)
Proposer is Female 0.96 -5.26*** 3.93
(0.45) (-1.66) (1.25)
Proposer believes he is paired with a recipient 1.38 5.44 0.42
(0.57) (1.50) (0.01)
Proposer expected a Trick going on 3.13 -1.86 5.99***
(1.35) (-0.59) (1.85)
Proposer trusted the experiment was conducted as explained -1.50 -7.63*** 0.13
(-0.59) (-1.68) (0.04)
Sigma 4.26 -1.50 -1.50
LogL -277.49 -126.54 -145.52
N 87.00 43.00 44.00
R2 anova 0.11 0.08 0.21
R2-decomp 0.11 0.08 0.21
** 5% significance; *** 10% significance. T-values are reported in brackets.
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5. DO SURNAMES CONVEY RACIAL IDENTITY?
Given the fact that this experimental design relies on surnames to credibly convey
information about racial identity, it is worth questioning whether the surname treatment
conveyed the race information as desired and whether participants found the
experimental setting credible. Table 4 presents evidence from the post-game surveys that
suggests that the overwhelming majority of proposers indicated that the surname of their
partner revealed information about the recipient’s ethnic or racial background.
Importantly, surnames appeared to convey information about ethnic or racial identity as
opposed to cultural or religious identity, at least in the minds of these participants. When
asked to explain why they thought the surname provided information about the racial
identity of the recipient, most participants correctly specified the race group of the
recipient with whom they were paired. Answers ranged from “Obviously he is black” to “It
is a Xhosa surname which mean hello” or “It is a European surname, so he must be white”.
A series of additional questions were also asked in order to assess whether proposers
found the experimental setting credible, and to measure possible doubt on the part of
participants. This follows work by Frolich et al. (2001) who have argued that doubt about
the validity of the experiment can affect the outcome of the dictator game, usually biasing
offers downwards.6 In our sample, the results suggest that most participants trusted that
the experiment was being run the way it was described and believed they were paired with
a real partner. While between 20 and 30% of participants thought there was a trick going
on, we control for this in the regression results presented in Table 3, and find that
our main findings concerning the association between racial identity and offers made
in the game remains robust. Interestingly, Black proposers who said they trusted
the experimental procedure, made significantly lower offers. This suggests that they
understood the experiment to be a non-strategic setting and they behaved more selfishly
(as one might expect). By way of contrast, White proposers who thought there was
some trick made significantly higher offers. This is contrary to what one might
expect. Frolich et al.’s work suggest that when participants doubt the validity of the
experiments, they tend to respond by sending less. However, it is conceivable that these
players thought there was a strategic element in the experiment and that they would
6 Frolich et al. (2001) demonstrate that when participants doubt the credibility of the dictator
experiment, thy tend to display more selfish behaviour and make lower offers. This is attributed to
the fact that if proposers doubt the existence of a partner, or believe there is a trick going on that
they are not fully aware of, they rationally choose to keep their endowment for themselves.
Table 4. Experimental validity in the minds of participants
Proposer is White (%) Proposer is Black (%)
Player B’s surname indicated the ethnic or racial group that Player B belongs to. 79.50 90.70
Player B’s surname indicated the religious or cultural group Player B belongs to. 36.40 20.90
I trusted that the experiment was being run the way it was described to me. 70.50 90.50
I thought that there was a trick going on that I wasn’t being told about and this
affected my decision.
29.50 19.00
I was unsure whether money would really be sent to Player B. 8.60 23.60
I was unsure that I was really paired with someone. 10.30 21.40
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somehow be rewarded for making higher offers. Despite this, the race result continues to
hold.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the small but growing literature in the field of behavioural
economics in South Africa. While we do not wish to claim that our sample is in any way
representative of the South African population at large, this study does provide interesting
evidence on the lingering impact of racial identity on social interactions.
Our first result demonstrates that White proposers make significantly higher offers
than Black proposers, in both treatments. A plausible explanation for this difference may
lie in the socio-economic differences between Black and White participants in our
sample. However, in order to demonstrate this case convincingly, future experimental
work will need to take the issue of measuring socio-economic status across participants far
more seriously. This is particularly difficult with university students, since trying to obtain
credible measures of household income status can be quite difficult (and indeed, proved
to be the case in this study), particularly for students living in residence far away from
home.
Secondly, we show that while White proposers make significantly higher offers than
Black proposers on average, White proposers exhibit an insider bias, making significantly
higher offers to White partners. In our study, while we are able to demonstrate that this
result is robust even after one controls for doubt in the minds of participants about the
experiment, we are not able to provide any causal explanation for why White proposers
might favour insiders while Black proposers do not. Again, this is a task for future research
work in this area. Examining features such as the racial composition of peer groups,
attitudes towards redistribution and affirmative action, participation in religious
activities, and the role of social capital explanators such as participation in extra-curricular
groups are all potentially useful avenues of investigation. It would also be useful
to replicate these results with larger sample sizes, and perhaps with groups that are
not comprised of university students. Finally, utilising additional experiments that
incorporate a strategic element, and allow us to distinguish whether these kinds of insider
biases reflect prejudice (or Becker’s “taste for discrimination”) as opposed to some other
behavioural explanation such as statistical discrimination is a key area for further research
in this field. Understanding these behavioural phenomena will help us evaluate the state
of South Africa’s transition to democracy better.
APPENDIX 1: Examples of surnames
White-sounding surnames Black-sounding surnames
Burman Zakeyo
Griffin Gozo
Higgins Moyo
Hopwood Mokowyane
Einhorn Mokhine
Abbot Makhalima
Krynauw Nyemba
Martin Mnwana
Bradfield Matwa
Langmann Khambule
Petersen Mbeke
Helm Chandalala
Rasmussen Skosana
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APPENDIX 1: Continued
White-sounding surnames Black-sounding surnames
Giles Mathibe
Butler Sekhesa
Cohen Mollo
Bartmann Khoza
Neale Mbanjwa
Sutherland Dlamini
Fransman Baisitse
Funke Mabyang
Loxton Bani
Krynauw Manda
Hutton Sifunda
Corrigan Vusi
Hart Giyose
Henshall-Howard Viwe
Carr Motsoaledi
Armstrong Magudulela
Lloyd Takalani
Stern Magudulela
Meadon Nthangeni
Pastoll Sidumo
Watkins Maketa
Smith Zulu
Kartstel Nyoni
Chandler Kakana
Hurwitz Mbonambi
Palmer Cetshana
Alcock Mokhine
Hosly Khumalo
Ingwersen Tsotetsi
Lawson Unathi
Einhorn Gqagqa
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